A World Without Pretense?
Honest and Dishonest Signaling in Social Life

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The title of my essay is inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein who in his Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology asks: “Could one imagine a world in which there could be no pretence?” Again he asks: “Can one imagine people who cannot lie? — What else would these people lack?,” and answers: “We should probably also imagine that they cannot make anything up and do not understand things that are made up.” The authors whose writings I plan to discuss do not go so far as to envision a world in which the capacity to pretend or simulate is entirely lacking. But in what might be viewed as a compensatory response to the seeming pervasiveness of lying, fraud, and deception in our daily lives, many emotion theorists are committed to the idea that the problem of cheating and dissimulation can be alleviated, if not completely eliminated, because there exist inbuilt mechanisms of reliable or truthful signaling. They adopt the view that honesty, or knowing whom to trust, is guaranteed in advance, as it were, because difficult or impossible-to-fake facial movements and other non-verbal signals have evolved through natural selection to provide accurate information about a person’s internal, affective states. We might put it that such emotion theorists believe they have found a solution to the philosophical problem of other minds by appealing to the idea of innately determined emotional “expressions” that, under the right conditions, unfailingly signal to us what other people are thinking and feeling because those expressions are hardwired to do so. These same emotion theorists further believe, or proceed as if they believe, that without such a system of communication designed by natural selection to automatically vouchsafe the genuineness and sincerity of emotional signals, trust, cooperation, and indeed genuine altruism are doomed to be undermined by the selfish human tendency to cheat. They therefore propose that the evolution of reliable emotional signals helps answer the basic political question of how it is that unrelated human beings can come to trust and hence cooperate with each other in civic life.

ROBERT FRANK AND THE BASIC EMOTION PARADIGM

The literature on these topics is enormous. In my essay I want to focus on the claims that have been made about the nature of emotional signaling. One obvious place to begin is with Robert Frank’s influential book, Passion Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions, published more than twenty years ago, in 1988. In that work the author, an economist who combines concerns with game theory and evolutionary psychology, set out to challenge the then commonly accepted view that people always act rationally, which is to say, selfishly, in pursuit of their own financial and other interests. In opposition to such a “self-interest” model of human action, Frank proposed a commitment model of behavior. According to Frank’s commitment model, our passions predispose us to act “irrationally.” By this he meant that our emotions prompt us to act in ways that may be contrary to our own
immediate interests but that offer advantages to us because, if our commitments are trustworthy, we stand to benefit from the possibility of social cooperation our credibility and trustworthiness confer. Frank described the results of several one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas and other economic games in support of the idea that the majority of people put issues of fairness above self-interest, and that individuals are capable of communicating their honesty to others and discerning whom they, in turn, can trust. For Frank, then, our emotions play an important role in our personal interactions because they are “commitment devices” which tell the truth about our inner emotional states, thereby encouraging others to count on us and work together with us. Literary critic William Flesch has recently summarized Frank’s argument in this way:

Honest signaling has a long-term advantage, and what makes honest signals honest is that they are difficult to fake and difficult to hide, even when doing so would yield a short-term advantage. Emotion commits us to doing things that might be against our short-term interest, and palpable emotion declares that commitment. To use Robert Frank’s formulation … visible emotion solves commitment problems. You can trust someone who acts on the basis of passion rather than reason, and you can tell that they are acting on the basis of passion when the expression of their passions is counter to their own immediate interests. This is one of the things that make that expression an honest — and so costly — signal.5

As Flesch’s remarks suggest, and as Frank also emphasized, if the passions are to function as commitment devices, people who have altruistic or honest intentions must be discernibly different from those who do not, so that observers can accurately discriminate between dependable signalers and imposters. Frank thus held that trust depends on the existence of visually salient behavioral clues that are difficult to willfully produce and hence costly to feign or simulate because they involuntarily signal our internal affective states.6 He recognized that clues to behavioral dispositions are not perfect: lie-detection systems will sometimes fail, and double-dealers will take advantage of this fact. As he also suggested, in a world in which pretense or lying did not exist no one would be on the lookout for deception, with the result that cheaters would flourish and the whole signaling system would crumble. In any mixed population there thus exists an “uneasy balance between people who really possess the underlying emotions and others who merely seem to. Those who are adept at reading the relevant signals will be more successful than others. There is also a payoff to those who are able to send effective signals about their own emotional predispositions.”7

According to Frank, communication is made easier for us precisely because signaling our passions is not really a matter of choice but of the automatic discharge of internal states — states that manifest themselves in characteristic expressions of the face and the body that humans have also evolved to be able to read. In making this claim, Frank relied in part on the theories and findings of the leading emotion researcher in 1988 and still the preeminent theorist of affect today, the psychologist Paul Ekman, who situates his work in a lineage that reaches back to Darwin’s fundamental work on the expression of the emotions. I can summarize the key features of Ekman’s approach to the emotions as follow:

1. There exists a small set of basic emotions, defined as pan-cultural categories or “natural kinds.” These basic emotions, which include fear,
anger, sadness, disgust, joy, and surprise, are evolved, genetically hardwired, reflex-like responses of the organism.

2. Each basic emotion manifests itself in distinct physiological and behavioral patterns of response, especially in characteristic facial expressions.

3. According to Ekman’s “neurocultural” model for explaining commonalities and variations in human facial movements, when the basic emotions are not disguised by cultural or conventional norms or “display rules” about how to control and manage our emotions in public, or when they are not masked by deliberate deception, the face “expresses” the affects. In other words, under the right conditions facial displays are authentic “readouts” of the discrete internal states that constitute the basic emotions. Ekman called the muscles involved in the facial expression of the emotions “reliable” muscles because they are difficult to control and hence produce expressions that are hard or costly to fake.8

4. Each basic emotion is linked to specific neural substrates or “affect programs” located subcortically in the brain, an assumption that implies the embrace of some degree of modularity and information-encapsulation in brain function. Thus the amygdala has been pinpointed as the neural seat of fear, while the insula has been implicated in disgust.9

5. Another of Ekman’s important assumptions is that although the emotions can and do combine with the cognitive systems in the brain, emotion and cognition are essentially separate processes. For Sigmund Freud and the “appraisal theorists” such as Richard Lazarus, Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum, Phoebe Ellsworth, and others, emotions are embodied intentional-cognitive states that are directed toward objects and depend on our beliefs and desires. This is a view that makes emotional processing a complex inter-subjective process. But Ekman interprets the affects as independent of cognition because they are non-intentional responses, which is why they tell the truth about our inner feelings.10 According to this view, when we are alone we are able to express our genuine feelings without the inhibition of culture, because no one is watching us. Ross Buck, a disciple of Ekman, has affirmed this position by claiming that: “When the sender is alone … he or she should feel little pressure to present a proper image to others, and any emotion expression under such circumstances should be more likely to reflect an actual emotional/motivational state.”11

6. Not surprisingly, Ekman’s ideas provide an explanation of lying according to which what is hidden in deception is detectable through the “leakage” of unmanaged emotional behavior, because emotions are unintentional, automatic expressive states. He and his colleagues have performed numerous studies on the basis of this claim, ostensibly demonstrating the involuntary escape of emotion in situations of deceit.12

In this essay, I shall call Ekman’s emotion paradigm the Basic Emotions View.
Ekman has conducted many experiments that appear to demonstrate the truth of his claims. Chief among them have been cross-cultural judgment studies purporting to show that many different kinds of observers across the world, in literate and preliterate cultures alike, are able to recognize the primary affects on the basis of posed facial expressions. Another iconic study involved Ekman’s use of a hidden camera to secretly videotape the so-called “spontaneous” facial expressions of American and Japanese students as they watched brief clips of stressful films. He maintained that both groups of students experienced negative emotions when viewing the stress films, but that the Japanese students masked their negative feelings more effectively than their American counterparts when in the presence of an authority figure, because of the influence of Japanese display rules controlling for polite smiles. He therefore interpreted his results to mean that the universal, biologically based negative feelings in this case remained intact beneath the culturally determined behavior.

To return to Robert Frank’s ideas: Ekman’s Basic Emotions View lies behind Frank’s claim that our emotions are commitment devices because they are involuntary readouts of our internal affective states. Frank devoted a chapter of his book to a summary of putative facts about involuntary facial expression largely drawn from Ekman’s work. Following Ekman, Frank reported that even when a facial expression involves muscles that are relatively easy to control, some of the most reliable clues to emotion come from so-called “micro-expressions,” tiny involuntary movements of the muscles that are held to accurately convey the underlying emotion for a fleeting instant. For Frank and Ekman, if deception is hard to get away with, it is because those telltale micro-movements tend to betray to others the truth of our emotional states.

The New Ethology and Fridlund’s Critique of the Ekman Paradigm

Frank’s 1988 book on emotional commitment soon garnered support from an array of commentators in diverse fields. And yet — and this is a point I especially wish to stress — already by 1988 a revolution in the theory of animal signaling had started to challenge the basic premises of Frank’s and Ekman’s arguments. Let me explain what I mean. According to the “classical” approach to animal communication associated with the influential work of the ethologists Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen that held sway until the 1970s, animal signals have evolved for the mutual benefit of signalers and receivers, which is to say that natural selection works for the good of the group or species. “Thus the classical ethological view held that ‘it is to the advantage of both parties that signals should be efficient, unambiguous, and informative.’” Displays on this classical model were viewed as “a kind of fixed action-pattern, and the responses of the recipients were just as fixed.” Although both Lorenz and Tinbergen gave some weight to learning as a modifier of instinct, the “release” of innate patterns held sway and culture had little influence. Ekman’s approach to the emotions conforms to this classical view because he treats facial expressions as adaptive mechanisms that have evolved to convey accurate information to others about the organism’s inner emotional state and therefore as useful for achieving social cooperation.
But starting in the mid-1970s, Richard Dawkins launched the “selfish gene” theory by emphasizing that in order to attain reproductive success individuals do not act for the good of the group so much as in their own interests. Dawkins’s selfish gene approach to natural selection immediately transformed the classical view of animal signaling. Rather than treating the relationship between signaler and receiver as one of harmonious cooperation in which the signaler aims to transmit information efficiently and accurately to the receiver, Dawkins and the ethologists influenced by him began to view animal displays as the expression of a kind of co-evolutionary “arms race” between animals. The emphasis now fell on the manipulative nature of animal signaling and on the corresponding selection pressures on the receiver to evolve vigilance and skepticism for displays in the form of finely tuned signal-detection abilities. On the classical model, animal communication was thought to be a cooperative process and in this sense good for the group, so deception was deemed unlikely. But with the new emphasis on the part played by the selfish gene in the evolutionary process, cooperative signaling was called into question and deception seemed more probable.18

Above all, the selfish gene approach to ethology stressed the idea that from the point of view of the individual or the gene it would not be adaptive for the signaler to signal his or her intentions at all times. A “readout” view of signaling was thus rejected in favor of a “manipulative” or “exploitative” account of animal behavior according to which signalers attempt to maximize their own interests by “mind-reading” their victims — that is, by looking for the fine clues by which they can predict how their victims may act.19 And of course the so-called “victims” of manipulation are not passive but have also evolved to exploit and mind-read as well, so that they too resort to concealment and active deception, including deliberately misleading their opponents. One of the important challenges for the new ethology then became how to theorize the achievement of an ecological balance between honest and dishonest signaling. The problem posed was that if everyone starts to cheat, then eventually no receiver will bother to respond to signals and the signaling system will collapse. But honest signaling cannot be the whole answer either, otherwise deception would have disappeared — and this has not happened. Hence there was a felt need to come up with plausible accounts of how an equilibrium between honest and dishonest signaling could be realized in nature. Much of the work on “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies” stimulated by the new ethology has been carried out by theorists expert in the use of game-theoretical models. As the huge literature in this field testifies, many of the issues at stake in this domain of research are still not resolved.20

For my purposes, what was significant about the “new ethology” was the impact it had on the theorizing of the emotions. Almost for the first time, psychologists and ethologists found common ground in the need to rethink the phrase “the expression of the emotions” that had been inherited from Darwin. We might put it that the new ethology loosened the one-to-one correspondence that had been held to exist between internal affective states and external facial expressions by suggesting that the relationship was more labile than had been thought and by stressing instead the
instrumental, cognitive, and social-strategic dimension of facial displays. One result was that Ekman’s quasi-reflexive theory of the human face, which was predicated on the classical ethological view of signaling, was “left stranded by the new understanding of the complexity of nonhuman animal signals.”21 There is an interesting story to be told about the work of various psychologists and ethologists who, stimulated by Dawkins’s selfish gene approach to signaling, contributed to new ways of thinking about the affects, contributions which, starting in the late 1970s, have posed an alternative of sorts to the dominant readout view of emotional expression. But in fact none of those contributors managed to break definitively with Ekman’s paradigm. Instead, they tended to settle on the notion of some kind of “internal state” as a necessary invoker of expressive behavior. They therefore proposed a compromise between “expression” and “negotiation” by positing the existence of a continuum between innately determined universal emotional “expressions” at one end (for example, infant expressions) and strategic signaling at the other end (for example, threat postures). And they did so in terms that tended to repackage the dualism between innately driven facial signals versus learned cultural displays on which Ekman’s emotion theory depended.22

One person, however, made a decisive break with Ekman at this juncture. This was the psychologist, Alan Fridlund, a former student of Ekman’s who, in the light of the new ethology, now radically revised his standpoint. It was Fridlund who in the early 1990s figured out the fundamental stakes of what he came to call the “Behavioral Ecology or Communication View” of faces and who, in a deeply researched book published in 1994, laid out the new terms in which he thought the emotions should now to be theorized. Fridlund’s basic insight was precisely that, in the light of the new ethology, facial displays could not be considered to be simple readouts of underlying “basic emotions” because they are instead intentional communicative signals that aid in the negotiation of social encounters. As he argued:

\[\text{Any reasonable account of signaling must recognize that signals do not evolve to provide information detrimental to the signaler. Displayers must not signal automatically, but only when it is beneficial to do so, that is, when such signaling serves its motives. Automatic readouts or spill-outs of drive states (i.e., “facial expressions of emotion”) would be extinguished early in phylogeny in the service of deception, economy, and privacy. Thus, an individual who momentarily shows a pursed lip on an otherwise impassive face is not showing “leakage” of anger but conflicting intentions, for example, to show stolidity and to threaten.}\]

From this it followed that emotional displays should not be regarded as readouts of internal states but rather as intentional movements serving various social motives. This meant not only that such displays are responsive to proximate elicitors but are sensitive also to other persons who are present, one’s aim toward them, and the nature and context of the interaction. Fridlund contrasted Ekman’s Basic Emotion View of facial displays with his Behavioral Ecology View in order to bring out the differences between them. Ekman’s view, as Fridlund described it, is essentially a model of the emotions that posits two basic kinds of faces. First are the innate reflex-like faces that read out ongoing emotion; these are termed “facial expressions of emotion.” Second are the learned, instrumental faces that connote emotion that is not
actually being experienced; these instrumental faces reflect ordinary dissimulations, such as smiles of politeness. According to Ekman’s model, the facial expressions of everyday life represent an interaction between emotional instigation and cultural adulteration or masking. The model thus assumes a dualism between felt or authentic displays on the one hand, and false or inauthentic displays on the other: the felt or authentic smile is the smile we involuntarily produce when we are genuinely or honestly happy, and the false or inauthentic smile is the one we produce when we are merely pretending to feel joy. Ekman claimed that the authentic smile cannot be produced on demand without betraying its inauthenticity. Robert Frank in his 1988 book echoed this view when he observed that “we apparently know, even if we cannot articulate, how a forced smile differs from one that is heartfelt.”

Ekman’s emotion model thus depends on a series of oppositions between innate signals versus learned ones; between biology and culture; between involuntary signals and voluntary ones; between non-intentional emotional states versus intentional deception; and between honest or reliable signaling versus dishonest or deceptive communication.

In contrast to the Basic Emotions View, Fridlund’s Behavioral Ecology View does not treat facial displays as expressions of discrete, internal emotional states. As Fridlund states:

> For the contemporary ethologist or the behavioral ecologist, displays have their impact upon others’ behavior because … vigilance for and comprehension of signals coevolved with the signals themselves. The balance of signaling and vigilance, countersignaling and counter-vigilance, produces a signaling “ecology” that is analogous to the balance of resources and consumers, and predator and prey, that characterizes all natural ecosystems. Displays are specific to intent and context, rather than derivatives or blends of fundamental emotional displays.… Instead of there being six or seven displays of “fundamental emotions” (e.g., anger) there may be one dozen or one hundred “about to aggress” displays appropriate to the identities and relationships of the interactants, and the context in which the interaction occurs. The topography of an “about to aggress” display may depend on whether the interactant is dominant or nondominant, conspecific or extraspecific, and whether one is defending territory or young, contesting for access to a female, or retrieving stolen food or property.25

In comparing facial displays as interpreted by Ekman’s Basic Emotions View and by his own Behavioral Ecology View, Fridlund does not depict prototype faces for each emotion category. This is because in his opinion there seem to be no prototype faces for each category. Rather, he reinterprets Ekman’s emotion categories in the following way:

> Displays exert their influence in the particular context of their issuance; a face interpreted as “contemptuous” in one context may be interpreted as “exasperated” or even “constipated” in another. Thus, in contexts in which one would try to appease another, any smile one issued would tend to be labeled a “false smile” in the Emotions View, which would connote a masking smile over some other emotion. For the behavioral ecologist, the same smile would likely be labeled an “about to appease” display, and it would deliver the same message as the words, “I give in” or “Whatever you say.”26

For Fridlund, the “facial expression of emotion” of Ekman’s Basic Emotions View actually serve the social motives of the displayer: “No distinction is made between ‘felt’ and ‘false’ displays issued by ‘authentic’ and ‘social’ selves; instead
all displays are considered to arise from interaction, thus there is only an interactive self.‘27 He therefore contests Ekman’s claim that when we are alone we display our natural expressions untainted by the contamination of culture; for Fridlund, solitary facial displays are social, too.‘28

One of the changes in perspective that Fridlund’s new approach brings about concerns precisely the nature and role of deception. In Ekman’s Emotions View, deception is regarded as a deliberate effort to hide one’s true emotions, an effort that is ostensibly betrayed by the “leakage” of unmanaged emotional behavior. But Fridlund instead regards deception as omnipresent in nature and potentially highly advantageous for the displayer. In an original reinterpretation, he treats the results of lie-detection research, ostensibly demonstrating the existence of emotional leakage in subjects asked to deceive, as instead reflecting conflicts over intentions, specifically conflicts about lying — and he cites convincing experimental results to back up that suggestion.‘29 At the same time — and this is a point I wish to stress — Fridlund characterizes Dawkins’s somewhat cynical model of the evolution of signal systems as “regrettably oversimplified” because of its exploitative view of animal communication.‘30 On the one hand, Fridlund welcomes Dawkins’s approach to signaling because its emphasis on manipulation and deception has helped turn attention to the flexibility and sociality of nonhuman displays. On the other hand, Fridlund stresses that the relationships between manipulator and mind reader or receiver are often cooperative. He therefore posits the existence of a dynamic equilibrium between cooperative signals on the one hand, and exploiters who devalue the signals by imitating them (that is, by cheating). What he denies, however, is that cooperation comes about because some facial signals function indexically and causally to produce automatic readouts of internal states, as if nature has provided an automatic guarantee of reliability. Rather, he treats facial movements as strategic signals through and through; they are, as he has stated, simply messages that influence the behavior of others because vigilance for and comprehension of signals have co-evolved with the signals themselves. In other words, facial movements primarily serve social motives, with the result that the costs and benefits of signaling vary with the momentary social context and the animal’s intentions. For Fridlund, there is no way to know in advance if another human being is trustworthy just because her facial expression is thought to provide surefire signs of the truth of her inner states, regardless of context or receiver. Rather, human signals, like the signals of many other animals, are dependent on motive and situation. They are social tools that aid in the negotiation of social communications.

In his book, Fridlund not only offered a theoretical intervention in the debate over the nature of the emotions and signaling. He backed up his arguments by exhaustively reviewing the extensive literature in the field, by offering new experimental results, and by making critical reinterpretations of some of Ekman’s canonical experiments. Especially striking was the evidence Fridlund adduced on “audience effects,” that is, on the ways in which human and indeed nonhuman animal facial and vocal displays vary with the presence of interactants and with the relationship between those interactants and the displayer. These findings support
Fridlund’s model of the emotions as strategic moves in the context of a social transaction and suggest that Ekman’s distinction between “felt” smiles versus “false” ones cannot be sustained. Fridlund deployed his approach to especially dazzling effect when he undertook a reevaluation of Ekman’s famous study of Japanese and American responses to stress films by showing that the differences observed between the facial displays of the Japanese and American students in Ekman’s well-known experiment were due to cultural differences in the management of facial behavior. In short, Fridlund treated Ekman’s Japanese-American experiment as itself a study of “audience effects.” Finally, as further evidence of the validity of the new Behavioral Ecology View of emotions, Fridlund included in his book an important chapter by another emotion researcher, psychologist James Russell, who offered a devastating critique of Ekman’s cross-cultural judgment studies. The result of Russell’s criticisms was to further emphasize the poor link between internal emotional states and facial displays on which so much of Ekman’s position had depended. Backed up as Fridlund’s position was by his impeccable credentials as a researcher, by his new findings, and by his and Russell’s critiques of the experimental protocols used in Ekman’s research, the stage seemed set for a brand new orientation in the field.

THE PROBLEM OF DECEPTION

But this was not to be — it has not happened, at least not yet. In spite of these and related developments, including more recent challenges to Ekman’s work that build on Fridlund’s and Russell’s criticisms, the Basic Emotions View remains the dominant paradigm in affective psychology and neuroscience, the paradigm that continues to inform and inspire the majority of experimental studies. But if one is convinced, as I am, that Fridlund, Russell, and the other critics are right and that Ekman is mistaken about the nature of emotional signaling, then the continued success of Ekman’s paradigm cries out for explanation. Of course, it is not surprising that Ekman continues to vigorously defend — sometimes in disconcertingly slippery ways — the correctness of his position. Nor is it mysterious why so many scientists, trained in Ekman’s experimental techniques and theoretical assumptions, should likewise stick with his research program, even if important critiques have to be ignored and cracks in the edifice must be papered over. Ekman’s methodologies and presuppositions fit so well with the reigning paradigms in evolutionary psychology and with modern imaging technologies, such as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, that they are hard to give up. More puzzling, perhaps, is why certain scholars in the humanities and social sciences who are swept up in today’s general turn to affect should likewise be attracted to Ekman’s ideas. One answer is that, for reasons I have tried to analyze elsewhere, there is a strong trend right now toward theorizing affect in the same non-cognitive or non-intentionalist terms as in Ekman’s paradigm, which is to say that there exists a natural affinity between the views of today’s “affect theorists” and Ekman’s position.

Especially interesting in this regard are various relatively well-informed commentators who, in spite of the fact that they have read and in a sense appreciate Fridlund’s critique, nevertheless continue to seek ways to accommodate Ekman’s
This brings me back to the topic of honesty and dishonesty in signaling with which I began my talk. Because if one asks what motivates today’s theorists who, in spite of damaging criticisms of Ekman’s position, nevertheless continue to adhere to his Basic Emotions View, it seems plausible to me to suggest that the answer lies in their concerns about deception — in other words, that it is because they wish to secure emotional signaling from the threat of dishonesty that they continue to support Ekman’s now somewhat discredited views. One has the impression they fear that the capacity for sincerity and hence cooperation would disappear in the absence of facial movements guaranteeing the truth of the subject’s emotional states or commitments — as if, without the safeguards provided by the existence of innate mechanisms or indexical signals of this kind, our common-sense belief that people sometimes wear their emotions on the face is undone; and as if Fridlund’s arguments in support of the strategic nature of facial signaling leave no room for honest signaling — which of course is not the case.

When we turn back to the work of Robert Frank with which I began this talk, the situation is clear, because here we find an ongoing concern on his part with precisely the question of honesty and dishonesty in signaling. Since publishing his book in 1988, Frank has somewhat moderated his views. In particular, he has acknowledged that distinguishing cooperators (or honest signalers) from defectors (or dishonest ones) is not as simple as he had previously suggested. As he admits, for the sake of game theory simplification he had proceeded as if “cooperators” go around with a noticeable birthmark in the form of a red letter “C” on their foreheads, a red letter which defectors lack, thus suggesting the existence of a simple either-or or digital signaling system — a system that, he realizes, ignores the complexity of human motivation. Frank now accepts that finding cooperative partners does not depend on a single factor, such as inherently reliable, or unintentional facial signatures, but on many learned and cognitive signals as well. He no longer claims that emotions automatically bind people to act in a specific manner, even as he remains committed to the idea that the affects nonetheless influence patterns of behavior in systematic and predictable ways that help solve bargaining dilemmas. Indeed, throughout his more recent writings Frank is still convinced that, even if emotional signaling involves not just the simple dichotomous or digital process he had at first proposed, detecting honesty nevertheless includes as a crucial ingredient those hard-to-fake facial expressions characteristic of the basic emotions that reliably indicate people’s emotional states. In essentials, then, Frank’s position remains unchanged. As he writes:

The preference for cooperation is not an unconditional one, but rather one that depends strongly on the history of personal interaction between potential trading partners. But this amendment, in the end, is a detail. Even traditional preferences depend on context in essentially similar ways…. Narrow versions of the rational choice approach leave the moral emotions completely out of the picture. Naked self-interest is not an unimportant motive, of course, and these models can help us understand much of the observed human behavioral repertoire. But there is also much that is simply beyond the reach of these models…. By giving us a principled framework for broadening our assumptions about human motives, the Darwinian approach points the way to long-overdue enrichments of the rational choice approach.
Just how confused the situation in the field still remains can be gauged by looking briefly at a recent essay by philosophers Don Ross and Paul Dumouchel, who protest that the Ekman-style affect programs cannot play the strategic role in commitment that Frank assigns to them. Their objection is not so much to the validity of Ekman’s affect program theory as such, which they accept on the basis of others’ say-so. It is rather that they believe that not all emotions are alike, and that the ones that matter for strategic purposes cannot be the hard-wired, culturally invariant, hard-to-fake, involuntary signals Frank identifies. Ross and Dumouchel’s claim is that those (allegedly) hard-wired nervous responses are the wrong sorts of things for revealing the kinds of content most important to social games and hence cannot constrain game playing in the way Frank wishes. Instead, they suggest that the emotions performing that function must be ones belonging to “ritualized” or “conventionalized signaling systems,” systems that are not impenetrable to cognition but on the contrary involve signals enabling cognitively motivated negotiations. In effect, Ross and Dumouchel adopt a social-dynamic theory of signaling not unlike that proposed by Fridlund (whom they do not cite), a theory of signaling according to which individuals have the capacity to actively and strategically manipulate their emotional responses according to the situational context in which they find themselves. Their is a position that, as they state, makes human social relations a matter of beliefs, desires, and other intentional states, not of biological-causal eruptions and processes.38

So far so good, one might think. But look what happens when Ross and Dumouchel engage with the issue that has been the focus of my essay, the nature of deception. For as they realize, making emotional reactions a matter of strategic control reintroduces the very problem of feigning that Frank’s commitment theory was originally designed to solve. If Ekman is right and emotional signals are impossible or hard to fake because they are sub-cortical, automatic processes that are impenetrable to cognition and voluntary influence, then such signals can be trusted to tell the truth about our internal affective states. But if facial displays are forms of signaling that can be actively manipulated, then they can also be feigned, and the question of deception inevitably resurfaces. Yet Ross and Dumouchel see no special difficulty here. Fridlund has suggested on ethological grounds that signaling systems would not have evolved were they not in the long run advantageous for both signaler and receiver; on that basis he has proposed that various constraints on deceit are likely to be in play, even though some people will always feign and lie. In a somewhat similar spirit, Ross and Dumouchel submit that the balance between honesty and dishonesty in communication is a matter of people’s refusal to cooperate with others if the latter are too erratic or inconsistent in their interactions. For these authors, curbing lying is not a matter of sincerity-detection based on a putative either-or signaling system indicating the truth of an inner emotional state. Rather, constraints on deceit are a matter of social conventions that tend to encourage honesty and reciprocity between individuals and to punish non-cooperators or deviants who break with established expectations.
What matters, Ross and Dumouchel suggest, is the way in which people actualize or enact their intentions within particular conventions and expectations, conventions and expectations that serve to constrain their social interactions in ways that ensure a certain equilibrium. More broadly, they write: “We may therefore conclude that if it is conventionalized emotional expressions rather than inner states that play the main strategic role assigned to emotions by Frank, then the difficulties associated with feigning disappear; agents need only be capable of detecting departures from the conventions, rather than dispositions to ‘insincere’ expression.” They therefore suggest that emotions can thus fulfill their strategic function independently of any hypothesis concerning agents’ internal states or of their putative “true feelings.” Or again, they propose that “[T]here are not two different things, inner sincerity and behavioral stability, that can in principle come apart and in so doing give rise to feigning problems. ‘Sincerity’ just is behavioral stability.”

To my mind the reduction of “sincerity” to behavioral stability is too mechanical and externalist (I would like to say “behaviorist”) a formulation to provide anything close to intellectual satisfaction here. (I have the same qualms about the merely conventional nature of their notion of “convention.”) Put slightly differently, I am sympathetic — how could one not be — to Ross and Dumouchel’s desire to avoid a dualistic approach to the question of feigning. But so bald and un-nuanced an appeal to conventions, expectations, and behavioral stability will not, in my opinion, accomplish their aim.

The limitations of their point of view emerge rather starkly in their treatment of the example they offer of Winston Churchill’s morally vehement speeches in 1940, when he was rallying the British public to stand firm as Hitler bombed their cities. For Ross and Dumouchel, whether or not Churchill actually experienced powerful visceral reactions while the Luftwaffe attacked his country was irrelevant to the success of his speeches, once the latter were part of the public record. They suggest that even Churchill’s literal words — “We shall never surrender” — were “not on the face of things altogether to the point,” both because Hitler was not then demanding British surrender and because “no doubt some logically possible German action, if pursued with sufficient means, could have brought the British to the table.” What Churchill’s choice of emotional tone did, they suggest was to “set contours around the bargaining situation” by ensuring that “only offers of a level of generosity inconsistent with Hitler’s own levels of public bombast were worth pursuing seriously.” As a result, no negotiations were undertaken and Churchill “avoided the risk of being made to seem more uncompromisingly bellicose than his less confident colleagues might have supported.”

The problem with Ross and Dumouchel’s account, of course, is that it simply says that political speeches are largely rhetorical and that their effectiveness is not a function of their accurately reflecting the speaker’s genuine views or beliefs (I take it that that is their point). But who has ever doubted this? It is only on the basis of what I have called Ross and Dumouchel’s mechanical and externalist understanding of the joint issues of sincerity and feigning that they could imagine that Churchill’s 1940 speeches bear on those issues at all.
Nevertheless, their arguments were bound to trouble Frank because they contradicted so much of what he had argued for. Frank’s response is marked by several confusions and sorting them out is not an easy business. But I can bring my talk to a close by observing that a key issue for Frank concerns the problem of — you guessed it — sincerity. Asserting that “sincerity detection” lies at the core of his argument about the role of moral sentiments in civic life, he complains that Ross and Dumouchel make honesty irrelevant to human communication. Mocking their Churchill example, he asks them to imagine that a modern leader facing a similar challenge tapes an equally impassioned speech urging citizens to hold firm. But it is all a pose, and at the end of the session, with the tape still running, the leader giggles uncontrollably at the thought of how convincingly he has just managed to feign moral outrage. He then instructs the technicians to edit his laughter out before sending the tape to the networks for broadcasting. Now two tapes of the speech exist, one with the giggling and one without. As Frank understands Ross and Dumouchel, they believe it would make no difference which version is sent out for broadcast, since in each case viewers will make exactly the same inferences. Frank disagrees, and suggests that it would be easy to design a laboratory experiment to see who is right.41

Needless to say, Frank’s response is based on a misunderstanding of Ross and Dumouchel’s position. For them, “sincerity” is not a function of the manifesting the eruption of an authentic mental state on the face or in the voice but rather of the consistency with which people behave in their social interactions with others. Of course, therefore, Ross and Dumouchel think it would make a difference if an audience heard an ostensibly serious speech followed by giggles: the latter would undermine the image of the leader with whom it had previously thought it was interacting and the effect of his speech would be undone. So Ross and Dumouchel have no difficulty rebutting Frank.42 But the entire debate, takes place at a palpable distance from the heart of the matter, which — my opening citation of Wittgenstein virtually says as much — cannot be resolved apart from an active engagement with the ongoing philosophical problem of other minds — a problem, I need hardly add, that lies outside the borders of psychology as traditionally conceived. Stanley Cavell has characterized Wittgenstein’s business in the *Philosophical Investigations* as the attempt to “undo the psychologizing of psychology, to show the necessities in human action and passion themselves” — but this really does bring me to the end of my essay.43

1. This essay is part of a book in progress on the history of theoretical and experimental approaches to the emotions from the post-World War II period to the present.
is about recognizing reasons. Of course, other mechanisms by which cooperation can be achieved have been proposed, such as the theory of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and group selection.

4. “Commitment” in its game-theoretic sense “involves a player in a game taking an action that changes the configuration of the world such that, if the time comes when that agent would choose to renege on her promise or decline to follow through on her unsuccessful threat, she will be unable to do so. If the receiver of the threat or promise knows that such a commitment action has been taken, then she will take the promise or threat seriously.” See Don Ross and Paul Dumouchel, “Emotions as Strategic Signals,” Rationality and Society 16, no. 4 (2004): 253. Frank contends that evolution has produced and sustains emotional responses in organisms to serve as psychologically endogenous vehicles of such commitment.


6. Frank observed in this regard that: “Posture, the rate of respiration, the pitch and timbre of the voice, perspiration, facial muscle tone and expression, and movement of the eyes, are among the signals we can read. We quickly surmise, for example, that some one with clenched jaws and a purple face is enraged, even when we do not know what, exactly, may have triggered his anger…. At least partly on the basis of such clues, we form judgments about the emotional makeup of the people with whom we deal. Some people we sense we can trust, but of others we remain ever wary. Some we sense can be taken advantage of, others we instinctively know not to provoke. Being able to make such judgments accurately has always been an obvious advantage. But it may be no less an advantage that others be able to make similar assessments about our own propensities. A blush may reveal a lie and cause great embarrassment at the moment, but in circumstances that require trust there can be great advantage in being known to be a blusher” (Frank, Passions Within Reason, 8–9).

7. Frank, Passions Within Reason, 10–11.

8. Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 132. According to Ekman, emotions have evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with “fundamental life tasks,” such as avoiding predators, finding mates, fighting for resources, and so on (Ekman, Telling Lies, 46).

9. For a critique of the arguments for the amygdala as the seat of the discrete fear emotion see Ruth Leys, “How Did Fear Become an Emotional Object and What Kind of Object Is It?,” Representations 110, no. 1 (2010): 66–104. For a critique of arguments concerning the insula as the seat of the emotion of disgust, see Ruth Leys, “‘Both of Us Disgusted in My Insula’: Mirror Neurons and Empathy Theory,” nonsite.org, February 2012.

10. As Flesch observes in this regard: “The fact that emotional signaling is uncalculated ensures its honesty” (Flesch, Comeuppance, 97). For Ekman’s list of the defining characteristics or properties of the basic emotions see Paul Ekman, “Basic Emotions,” in Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, eds. T. Dalgleish and M. Power (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 1999), 56. The characteristics are: (1) Distinctive universal signs. (2) Distinctive physiology. (3) Automatic appraisal, tuned to: (4) Distinctive universals in antecedent events. (5) Distinctive appearances developmentally. (6) Presence in other primates. (7) Quick onset. (8) Brief duration. (9) Unbidden occurrence. (10) Distinctive thoughts, memories, images. (11) Distinctive subjective experience.


12. Indeed, since 9/11 Ekman has been working on methods of surveillance designed to read the telltale involuntary facial signs that are thought to betray the terrorist, methods based on the idea that we can count on science to reliably distinguish between authentic feeling and those that are feigned. Ekman’s
speculations have recently led to his involvement with a fanciful television series, “Lie to Me,” in which the lead character, a jet-setting Ekman surrogate named Lightman, oversees a large firm of beautiful men and women, reads faces to solve crimes, and routinely makes the police and the FBI look foolish.

13. Frank’s main source of information concerning how the body betrays the lie was Ekman’s *Telling Lies*.


16. In a characteristic statement, Tinbergen thus observed: “So far as our present knowledge goes, social cooperation seems to depend mainly on a system of releasers. The tendency of the actor to give signals is innate, and the reactors’ responses are likewise innate. We see therefore that a community functions as a result of the properties of its members. Each member has the tendency to perform the signal movements releasing the ‘correct’ responses in the reactor; each member has specific capacities that render it sensitive to the species’ signals. In this sense the community is determined by the individuals” (cited Fridlund, *Human Facial Expression*, 63).

17. In Ekman’s words, it is “central to the evolution of emotions that they inform conspecifics, without choice or consideration, about what is occurring inside the person … what most likely occurred before to bring about that expression (antecedents), and what is most likely to occur next.” Paul Ekman, “Basic Emotions,” in *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*, eds. T. Dalgleish and M. Power (Chichester and New York: Wiley, 1999), 47.


19. Note that Dawkins and Krebs invoke a “readout” view of motivation in describing the classical ethological position: “The classical ethological view emphasized the motivational state of the actor, and treated signals as formalized readouts of the actor’s internal state. Following our earlier analogy of the lie-detection machine, the reactor might be thought of as being provided with the equivalent of electrodes implanted in the actor’s skull, by means of which he could monitor changes in the actor’s internal state, and hence predict the actor’s future behavior. Natural selection is thought to favour actors who cooperate in having their intentions read — the recording electrodes are welcomed, perhaps even provided by the actor…. [W]e prefer to concentrate on the motivational state of the reactor, as being manipulated by the actor” (Dawkins and Krebs, “Animal Signals: Information or Manipulation?,” 306).


26. Ibid., 129.
27. Ibid., 130.
28. Fridlund remarks in this connection that displays are deployed and interpreted in the context of the interaction, or “social context.” This context is constituted both by its structural features, such as the setting, and by the relationships between the interactants and the accreted “common ground” arising from any previous interactions, which is to say it is structured by how well the interactants know each other. Finally, the “private context” of the participants in this schema consists of the set of expectations, needs and desires that each bring to the encounter.

29. Fridlund, Human Facial Expression, 137–38. Fridlund’s alternative interpretation of studies of lying and deception is that they are skepticism studies. He suggests in this regard that “nearly every human deception study … can be recast as a skepticism study, with the subjects who are the least deceived being, in effect, the best skeptics. Humans certainly calibrate their skepticism as a function of displayer and context” (75). Fridlund thus redefines deception and leakage studies as conflicts over intentions, specifically conflicts over intentions when the experimental subject is asked to deceive (137).

30. Fridlund, Human Facial Expression, 105, 107, 138. See also Alan J. Fridlund, “The New Ethology of Human Facial Expression,” in The Psychology of Facial Expression, eds. James A. Russell and José Miguel Fernández-Dols (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 103–29. Fridlund has even suggested that the very concept of emotion has become so lacking in consensus as to its meaning and so entwined with a false read-out view of the affects as to have almost outlived its usefulness.

31. Audience effects have also been reported in many nonhuman animals — a point worth emphasizing because worries about the emotional behavior of nonhuman animals (and human infants) often motivate theorists to adopt the Basic Emotions paradigm, on the grounds that nonhuman animals and human infants alike lack the basic cognitive skills apparently required for the strategic signaling posited by Fridlund and others. For audience effects studies see especially, Fridlund, Human Facial Expression, 145–168; and Russell and Fernández-Dols, The Psychology of Facial Expression.

32. In his critique Fridlund not only showed that Ekman’s published reports of his findings were inaccurate but that Ekman’s interpretation of the results in terms of the opposition between genuine emotional expressions versus culturally coded display rules was unsupported. Central to Fridlund’s critical reassessment was his rejection of Ekman’s fundamental assumption that the faces people make when they are alone are readouts, or authentic signs, of the truth of their inner emotional states. As Fridlund observed, Ekman had made that assumption in his crucial experiment on the differences between Japanese and American facial displays. Ekman’s assumption that the truth shows itself on someone’s face when she believes she is alone is an assumption that depends on the claim that a distinction can be strictly maintained between authentic and artificial signs, between nature and culture. But Fridlund repudiated that claim, offering a view of faces that stresses the implicit sociality of even so-called solitary facial movements. He treated the differences observed between the facial displays of the Japanese and American students in Ekman’s well-known experiment as cultural differences in the management of facial behavior. He pointed out in this connection that “the experimenter himself is always an implicit audience, and his or her laboratory is always the stage for the directorial effort known as an ‘experiment.’ Thus the ‘alone’ phase of the study was implicitly social, and the … interview phases were simply more explicitly social. Thus contrasting the facial behavior in the ‘alone’ versus the interview phase as authentic versus managed [or cultural] is over-statement at minimum” (Fridlund, Human Facial Expression, 291). In short, Fridlund regarded Ekman’s Japanese-American experiment as a study of “audience effects,” arguing that just because a viewer is alone physically does not mean that he is alone psychologically.


33. For a discussion and critique of recent Deleuzian-inspired and other affect theories that impose a mistaken separation between affect and cognition, see Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique.”


35. Thus in his 1988 book, for the sake of simplicity Frank had proposed the existence of a discrete or discontinuous system of signaling of this type, with the proviso that there had to be some cost involved to the observer in order to distinguish cooperators from defectors, and he had applied game theory to analyze the “break-even” point in terms of the mix of cooperators and defectors in a population when it would benefit cooperators to pay the cost of scrutiny (Frank, Passions Within Reason, 59–64). But he now concedes that “[M]ost of us cannot be easily assigned to a single category from the cooperator/defector pair. All but the most extreme sociopaths have within them the capacity to experience sympathy for others and to weigh others’ interests when deciding what to do. And although almost all of us have cooperated in situations in which it would have paid to defect, most of us have also let others down on occasion.... I now believe that the search for a reliable trading partner is not a quest to identify an indiscriminately trustworthy individual, but rather a process of creating conditions that make us more likely to elicit cooperative tendencies in others,” in Robert H. Frank, What Price the Moral High Ground? How to Succeed Without Selling Your Soul (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 13–14.

36. Frank thus expands his sense of what determines out affective responses to others to include the role of “sympathy” (Frank, What Price the High Ground, 13ff). But then, true to his original orientation, he goes on to define sympathy as an operation of bonding through a kind of mechanical copying — as if the elements of our sympathetic responses to others depend essentially on the triggering of involuntary, unconscious emotional, basic emotion reactions. See also in this connection Frank’s references, in his discussion of sympathetic bonding, to the research of Struck et al, 1988, on facial feedback, according to which facial displays themselves, rather than being readouts of emotional experience, are sufficient to induce emotion through proprioceptive feedback. In the experiment, Strack et al. attempted to show that forcing subjects to hold a fixed smile by making them hold a pen in their teeth induces the experience of happiness (Frank, What Price the Moral High Ground, 14–15). For trenchant criticisms of Strack et al. and related experiments on the facial feedback hypothesis, see Fridlund, Human Facial Expression, 178–82.

37. Frank, What Price the Moral High Ground, 26–27.

38. Don Ross and Paul Dumouchel, “Emotions as Strategic Signals,” 251–286. In this article, the authors tend to reproduce the two-factor system of Ekman’s neurocultural theory by dividing emotions into pre-cultural, invariant, biological-causal affect programs, or what they call “control-system mechanisms,” and culturally variable, conventional emotional systems or what they call “systems of interpretation of emotional displays.” Nevertheless, they are critical of the standard distinction between the “higher cognitive emotions” and the Ekman-style Basic Emotions (or lower “affect programs”), on the grounds in part that it is not clear how the former are built out of the latter. They argue that the so-called higher emotions are controlled largely by social dynamics that are independent of any autonomic or modular processes. On this basis they offer a trenchant critique of Frank’s assumption that Ekman’s affect programs can play the strategic role that Frank assigns them. According to Ross and Dumouchel, the types or categories with which we tend to label emotional responses are simply the names we give to events that appear as salient moments in uninterupted or continuous processes of affective expression, moments whose significance depends on the contexts in which those processes occur. According to the authors, then, emotional kinds are just what Adam Smith thought the “moral sentiments” were: conventionalized norms to which people at least generally conform their narratives of themselves and others. They are publicly constructed and reinforced conventions that set limits on both actions and motivations (Ross and Dumouchel, “Emotions as Strategic Signals,” 260).
40. Ibid., 280.
43. “Consider, for example, the question,” Cavell writes in an illuminating comment on a remark by Wittgenstein: “‘Could someone have a feeling or ardent love or hope for the space of a second — no matter what preceded or followed this second?’ (*Investigations*, par. 583). We shall not wish to say that this is logically impossible, or that it can in no way be imagined. But we might say: given our world this cannot happen; it is not, in our language, what ‘love’ or ‘hope’ mean; necessary in our world that this is not what love and hope are. I take it that our most common philosophical understanding of such notions as necessity, contingency, synthetic and analytic statements will not know what to make of our saying such things.” Stanley Cavell, “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” in *Must We Mean What We Say* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 91 and note 9.